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ABSTRACT
This paper summarizes recent empirical research on the determinants of subjective well-being.
Results from national and international samples suggest that measures of social capital, including
especially the corollary measures of specific and general trust, have substantial effects on well-being
beyond those flowing through economic channels. Cross-national samples (supported by parallel
analysis of suicide data) show large well-being effects from social capital and from the quality of
government.  Finally,  Canadian  life-satisfaction  data  show  that  several  non-financial  job
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1.  Setting the Stage 
Although I and many other economists are newcomers to the study of well-being, the 
field has had many illustrious contributors over the centuries. Thus I have been lucky 
enough to act as research assistant for both Aristotle (in How’s Life? Helliwell 2003) and 
Durkheim (Helliwell 2004). Working in Aristotle’s lab, it has been natural to concentrate 
on measures of life satisfaction rather than questions dealing with happiness, since he 
thought that a reflective rather than a momentary view was more likely to give a balanced 
assessment of what constituted the good life, and to support his view that the good life 
steered a middle course between the Stoics and the Epicureans. To a striking degree, 
modern data have tended to support the main hypotheses of Aristotle and Durkheim, both 
of whom attached great importance to the norms and support networks that have more 
recently been described as social capital (Putnam 2000, OECD 2001).  
 
In more recent work on well-being and the workplace, we are taking our methodology 
from Adam Smith by estimating the value of workplace social capital in terms of 
compensating or equalizing differentials (Helliwell and Huang 2005a). Smith (in the 
Wealth of Nations, book 1, chapter 10, part 1) and subsequent empirical researchers 
following his lead have tended to explain wage differences in terms of job characteristics. 
The key difficulty with explaining wages by job characteristics is that people of greater 
ability tend to find themselves jobs with both higher pay and better working conditions. 
This means that compensating differentials tend to be under-estimated, to the extent that 
differences in abilities cannot be properly controlled for. Measures of life satisfaction can 
be used to circumvent this problem, since the effects of income and non-income 
characteristics of the workplace can be included as separate determinants of life 
satisfaction, and the ratios of coefficients used to calculate compensating differentials. 
Adam Smith paid less attention to social capital than either Aristotle or Durkheim. The 
estimated compensating differentials for various measures of workplace trust and 
engagement are high enough to deserve his attention. 
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Before turning to specific results, it might be helpful to complete the stage-setting by 
dealing in advance with some of the doubts that social scientists, and especially 
economists, might have about the use of subjective evaluations of life satisfaction as 
proxy measures of utility. This paper gives priority to a particular range of measures of 
well-being, especially those asking individuals to rate their life satisfaction on a scale of 1 
to 10. The answers to such questions are being used increasingly in applied studies 
designed to assess the effects of a variety of variables subject in various ways to public 
policy- e.g. the valuation of airport noise (van Praag and Baarsma 2005).  
 
But are they the right questions? And can subjective answers to any such general 
questions be relied upon for either scientific or policy purposes? The use of such data in 
the ways I and others propose has been queried from several perspectives. First, there are 
those, among whom economists are often to be found, who are suspicious of subjective 
data of any kind, especially if there is any alternative possibility of inferring preferences 
from observed behaviour. The most effective answer to this type of scepticism is 
provided by the remarkable parallel between international results for life satisfaction and 
for suicide (Helliwell 2004), to be discussed later in the paper.  
 
 Second, among those who think that measures of subjective well-being are suitable 
objects of analysis, there are those who prefer to use samples or integrals of ‘experienced 
utility’ (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997) rather than reports of life satisfaction 
(‘remembered utility’) as the focus of attention. There is a wealth of experimental 
evidence (reviewed by Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997, Kahneman et al 2004 and by 
Kahneman and Riis, 2005) that subjects generally evaluate the pleasure or pain of past 
experiences by some average based on the peak and final moments, and not on a sum or 
integral of their moment-by-moment reactions. This peak-plus-terminal rule appears to 
apply fairly broadly, whether the experience under review is a vacation or a colonoscopy. 
Studies show that it is this remembered utility rather than any more evenly weighted sum 
of momentary experienced utilities that tends to govern subsequent decisions, be they 
about where to take holidays or whether to have another colonoscopy. Kahneman argues 
that primary research and policy attention should be given to experienced utility, with the   3 
apparent dominance of remembered utility as a driver of individual decisions to be 
treated as a mistake. I am rather more inclined to conclude that if remembered utility 
produces a consistent set of forward-looking decisions and backward-looking 
evaluations, then it should be given pride of place by analysts and policy-makers. To 
focus on maximizing what the researcher takes to be the integral of individuals’ 
experienced utility, if this is importantly at odds with what individuals remember, would 
seem bound to face voter rejection whenever exposed to the test of the ballot box. Since 
evaluations of remembered utility underlie currently reported life satisfaction, and have 
been shown to be the basis for individual-level decisions, they have credible claims as 
primary objects of policy-oriented research, providing a basis for both calculating and 
evaluating the effects of policy changes. 
 
A third line of objection relates to the possibly confounding role of personality 
differences. Optimists will tend to say that they are satisfied with their lives. They may 
well have rosy valuations of their health status. They may also be more likely to be 
married, have interesting jobs, and spend time with their neighbours, all of which have 
been found to be positively correlated with life satisfaction. Only a few surveys have 
questions that provide adequate personality data to assess the likely extent of this sort of 
bias. But some indicative results to be reported later suggest that many of the key 
relationships apply almost equally to sub-samples drawn from different personality types, 
and hence are not solely or even predominantly attributable to personality differences.  
 
There is also the related question of whether measures of life satisfaction have 
comparable meanings in different regional or national cultures. For example, King et al 
(2003) have found apparently differing uses of numerical scales in different societies, and 
advocate using anchoring vignettes as means of adjusting raw scores. To evaluate these 
risks, in the absence of specific anchors, Helliwell and Huang (2005b) use quintile 
averages, and population shares above particular numerical life satisfaction cut-off 
scores, as alternative dependent variables. Since these produce coefficient estimates 
strikingly like those based on national averages, international differences in scaling 
standards are not likely to lie behind the results reported here.   4 
 
It is also argued that there may be national differences in average personality or mood 
that make subjective data unreliable measures of physical health or life satisfaction. 
Kahneman and his collaborators suspect this to be the case. In support of this line of 
reasoning, they find (Kahneman and Riis, in press) a very high cross-national correlation 
for measures of life satisfaction and subjectively rated health, just as one would expect to 
find if there were international differences in expressed optimism or mood. To support 
this interpretation, they find no correlation between cross-country measures of subjective 
health and life expectancy in their sample comprising the richer European countries. 
Hence, they argue, there are grounds for treating international differences in both 
subjective health and life satisfaction as being ‘reality free’. I am over-simplifying and 
probably overstating the case being made in Kahneman and Riis (in press) and Riis, 
Schwarz and Kahneman (2005), but the basic point should be clear, and it is important 
enough to need to be addressed.  
 
One way of investing some reality in the cross-country differences in subjective measures 
would be to find them predictive of differences in behaviour. In this respect, it is useful to 
find that cross-country differences in subjective health add significantly (see Table 2) to 
the explained variance of suicide, with those populations reporting poorer average health 
having significantly higher suicide rates. Thus the subjective health data do appear to 
reflect reality, as shown by their ability to predict international differences in suicide 
behaviour. 
 
The suicide data, which obviously reflect behaviour, and hence reality, can also be used 
to address Kahneman’s fundamental concern that international differences in measured 
life satisfaction are in some sense too large to be believed. To illustrate the worry, 
Kahneman and Riis (in press) note that the World Values Survey measures of life 
satisfaction in the United States are higher than those in France by as much as the 
difference in life satisfaction between the employed and unemployed respondents in the 
United States. As shown in Helliwell (2004), the suicide data provide an independent 
way to judge whether the international variance of survey measures of life satisfaction is   5 
or is not too large to be believed. On the basis of a large Finnish survey (Koivumaa-
Honkanen et al 2001) that established baseline measures of life satisfaction followed up 
by twenty years of subsequent assessments of morbidity and mortality, it was possible to 
estimate, based on data from within a single country, a distribution of suicide conditional 
on the distribution of life satisfaction. This can then be applied to calculate hypothetical 
national suicide rates based on each country’s distribution of answers to the life 
satisfaction question. This distribution predicts very well the mean and standard deviation 
of the actual international distribution of suicide rates. Since the international variability 
of measures of life satisfaction is therefore no greater than that implied by international 
differences in suicide rates, it seems reasonable to infer that both are equally well 
grounded in the same realities. At any rate, the international differences in life 
satisfaction do not, at least by this test, seem to be implausibly large.  
 
This extended stage setting has been intended to show, by answering some plausible 
objections at the outset, that there is a good case to be made, beyond the recommendation 
of Aristotle (as quoted in Helliwell 2003, 332-3), for asking people to evaluate their lives, 
and for taking their answers seriously. Another more mundane reason for making use of 
rankings of life satisfaction is that there is a large body of such evidence already in hand, 
and the question is so simple to ask that it could in future be added at minimal cost to a 
wide variety of surveys commissioned for other purposes. 
 
 2. Results: Interpersonal Differences  
2.1 Demographics: Age, Gender, Marriage and Divorce 
Results in many countries are finding U-shaped patterns of well-being over the life cycle. 
Data from almost thirty years of Eurobarometer annual surveys in nine  countries show 
that the shape of the distribution of age effects is largely unchanged from decade to 
decade, and hence cannot reflect differentially happy cohorts moving through the age 
distribution Research using a large recent cross-section of Canadian life satisfaction data 
suggests that perhaps one-third of the U-shape is removed if a separate variable is added 
based on the respondent’s current estimate of stress related to work/life balance. 
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The Eurobarometer data can also speak to gender and marital effects. For the European 
sample as a whole, including both genders in the same equation reveals a negative male 
effect of 0.05 in the early 1970s, gradually falling to zero in the 1990s. There are no 
corresponding trends in the marital status coefficients. For the roughly 500,000 
observations of the whole European sample, relative to the unmarried base case, they are: 
living-as-married +.17, married +.14, separated -.30, divorced -.17, and widowed -0.10 
all on the 4-point scale. Since some longitudinal studies have shown marriage effects 
rising to an early peak and then falling almost to baseline in the few subsequent years 
(Clark et al 2003), it has been suggested that marital status is subject to baseline or 
habituation effects, with only slight effects after habituation sets in. Under this 
interpretation, the large cross-sectional estimates might reflect personality differences, 
with genetically happy people being more likely to report high life satisfaction, and also 
to attract marriage partners. However, results based on the 2003 Canadian General Social 
Survey (GSS), show that there are no changes in the marital status coefficients when a 
personality-based variable is added for each individual. 
 
2.2 Income 
Relative income effects appear among respondents in both OECD and developing 
countries (Helliwell 2003), but are larger, and show no evidence of diminishing returns, 
in the developing world. Within OECD countries, in contrast, there appears to be little 
income-induced increase in life satisfaction once one’s family income rises above the 
median income.  
  
2.3 The More We Get Together the Happier We’ll Be 
Aristotle and the campfire song both foreshadow the results in Helliwell and Putnam 
(2004) showing the SWB effects of frequent contacts with family, friends and 
neighbours. Earlier empirical literature on social capital made use chiefly of data for 
various types of memberships (e.g. Putnam 2000), because these were all that were 
broadly available. Recent purpose-built surveys have probed deeper, and developed 
various measures of the intensity of social linkages. In results from the Canadian ESC 
survey, those respondents who have frequent contacts with family, friends and   7 
neighbours have SWB almost a full point higher, on the 10-point SWB scale, than others 
with no such contacts. 
 
Trust is sometimes seen as consequence, as well as a facilitator, of frequently used 
networks. Life satisfaction appears to be related to various sorts of trust and also to the 
networks that may spawn or support trust. This mutual causality is thus likely to be 
difficult to disentangle, and there is also the issue of unmeasured personality differences, 
which are likely to influence trust, frequency of contacts, and life satisfaction, all in the 
same direction. Outgoing optimists may also, partly on the basis of their personalities, 
have better jobs and higher incomes. One way of testing the likely importance of 
personality-caused coefficient bias in the life satisfaction equations, is to test how robust 
are the estimates to the inclusion of a variable designed to capture a standard measure of 
personality. The 2003 Canadian General Social Survey (GSS) provide a good candidate 
measure, a ‘mastery scale’ based on answers to several questions designed to measure 
psychological coping resources (Pearlin and Schooler 1978, 20). It may run the risk of 
over-correcting for the effects of pure personality differences, since the answers 
document the extent to which respondents feel they are in command of their 
circumstances, so their answers are bound to be affected not just by underlying 
personality traits, but also by the circumstances they are currently facing. The results 
should be reassuring to those researchers who do not have personality variables to 
include in their analysis. As expected, the mastery variable is highly significant (t>19.). 
The coefficient on subjective health drops slightly (from 0.54 to 0.49, but still 
maintaining a t-value >40.), something that should be expected, since it was otherwise the 
variable most likely to have been personality-driven.  
 
The coefficients on social capital variables, such as time spent with family, friends and 
neighbours, and the trust placed in neighbours and the police, are unaffected by the 
inclusion of the personality variable. The negative SWB effects of further education, cet. 
par., are significantly greater when the mastery index is included, suggesting that 
education tends to increase respondents’ confidence in dealing with their circumstances. 
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2.4 Well-being and the Workplace 
Recent research based on three different Canadian surveys (Helliwell and Huang 2005a) 
provides strikingly large and firmly established estimates of the value of several non-
financial aspects of the workplace, and especially of workplace trust. For example, a one-
point change in job satisfaction, on a ten-point scale, would have the same well-being 
impact as a change of more than 0.5 in log income. These very large estimates of 
compensating differentials are rather precisely estimated, with t-values exceeding 6 in 
most specifications. Several measures of domain trust have strong linkages to subjective 
well-being, and workplace trust is the most important of all. To move up one-point on a 
ten-point scale of workplace trust is equivalent to a .17 change in log income (with a t-
value=5, see Helliwell and Huang 2005a, Table 5). 
3. Results: International Differences 
The World Values Survey has been evaluating life satisfaction and measures of social 
capital for more than twenty years in a growing number of countries. By combining 
individual observations from surveys taken in many countries, we have the possibility of 
combining individual and national-level data in the explanation of differences in well-
being (e.g. Helliwell 2003). Analysis of the importance of national-level variables is 
limited by the relatively small number of countries and survey waves. Time is gradually 
solving this problem: there were 86 national observations from 49 countries in the first 
well-being paper, 117 observations from 50 countries in the suicide paper, and 136 
observations from 57 countries for the latest equations shown in Table 1. These results 
are estimated entirely in terms of national averages, with variables found previously to be 
important at the individual level (divorce, belief in God and unemployment) being carried 
forward in combination with other variables with some combination of individual and 
contextual importance (membership densities and social trust) and the key national 
contextual variable, the quality of government as represented by indicators prepared at 
the World Bank by Kaufmann et al (2003). 
 
 3.1 Life Satisfaction and Suicide Data Tell Consistent Stories 
Although using national-level data removes the chance for separating individual-level 
from national-level effects, it was done in the first instance to facilitate exactly   9 
comparable modelling of life satisfaction and suicide data. The suicide and well-being 
data, if they tell consistent stories, offer complementary advantages. The suicide results 
are not open to many of the objections made about the use of subjective data as 
dependent variables, while the well-being data, when and if their validity is established, 
can be easily and widely collected so as to permit low-cost evaluations. By contrast, 
suicides are such extreme and rare events that they are not suitable for routine 
community-level evaluations.  
 
Table 1 shows the comparable results for the encompassing equation for suicide and 
well-being fitted for the 117-observation sample used in Helliwell (2004) and for a new 
larger sample, with almost identical results. In both samples the coefficients in the well-
being and suicide equations are fully consistent in sign and closely comparable in 
standardized size (as shown by Figure 5 in Helliwell 2004). Coefficient differences 
appear where other studies suggest they might, with both religious beliefs and divorce 
having more impact on suicides than on SWB, and the reverse being the case for the 
quality of government. These differences, combined with international differences in 
these three variables, explain why Sweden can fit both equations almost exactly, while 
having top values for SWB and more average levels for suicides.  
 
As already noted, Kahneman and colleagues have argued that international differences in 
SWB are suspiciously large and possibly reflective of differences in national mood rather 
than in objective well-being. The fact that the same equation fits national data for 
suicides and for well-being equally well and with comparable coefficients suggests that 
the SWB differences are substantive
1. It is also worth assessing, to the extent possible, 
whether there are also some identifiable personality differences at the national level that 
might help to explain international differences in well-being and suicides. Eysenck and 
colleagues have done bilateral personality comparisons between Great Britain and many 
other countries, using the three-factor Eysenck personality questionnaire (Eysenck and 
                                                 
1  However, it is important to note that there is no significant correlation between suicide and SWB if the 
sample is restricted to the OECD countries, and the explanatory power of both equations is much reduced. 
Kahneman and colleagues have focused their attention on the OECD countries, while all of the equations 
reported in this paper make use of the much larger global samples, where the cross-sectional variance of 
almost all variables is much greater.    10 
Eysenck 1975). Steels and Ones (2002) have assembled these data into an internationally 
comparable data set, thus providing the means to test the effects of these personality 
variables for a subset of countries. We have done this for 73 observations covering 29 
countries, with results shown in Table 1
2. With only half the number of countries, the 
basic equations are somewhat weaker, but are consistent with the results from the larger 
sample. Of the three Eysenck factors, only the extraversion (e) index has significant 
effects, which it has in both equations. Those ranking high in extroversion are more likely 
to rank high in SWB and less likely to commit suicide. The psychoticism index enters the 
SWB equation significantly, but only when interacted with the measure of social trust. 
The coefficients imply that trust has a greater impact on SWB in those countries ranking 
higher on the psychoticism index. 
 
Overall, adding the personality variables increases the explanatory power of both 
equations, especially that for suicide, without altering the pre-existing model structure. 
Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that international differences in measurable 
characteristics of personality do have some influence on both SWB and suicide rates. But 
this influence is above and beyond the explanatory power of the basic model, which 
appears to hold equally well whether or not account is taken of the available measures of 
international differences in personality. 
 
Finally, Table 2 shows the effects of adding subjective health to both the suicide and 
SWB equations, supplemented by equations dividing the subjective health variable into 
three components: life expectancy at birth, a measure of morbidity (LE minus HALE, as 
noted previously), and a variable called HEARTY, whose observations are the residuals 
of an equation explaining subjective health by LE and MORBID. The importance of 
morbidity in the suicide equation should be no surprise, as mental illnesses contribute to 
the measure, and several types of mental illness (schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder in 
particular) pose high suicide risks. As already noted, subjective health has a significant 
impact on the suicide rate, with the other equations showing that this effect is especially 
                                                 
2 The t-values are based on robust standard errors calculated on the (correct) assumption that errors are 
clustered by country.   11 
strong from the morbidity variable and the psychological and related conditions covered 
by HEARTY. In the well-being equation, life expectancy and the residual variable are the 
most important components, with morbidity being less important.   
 
3.2 How Much Does Good Government Matter? 
The quality of government, as measured by different averages of the six main Kaufman et 
al (2003) measures, has a strikingly large influence in explaining international differences 
in SWB. It is worth noting that these assessments are not done by the respondents to the 
surveys, and are hence not subject to the risk of excluded personality factors that might 
bias the results. In any event, as already seen in Table 1, including explicit measures of 
international personality differences does not lessen the estimated effects of 
governmental quality. The six measures can be divided into two groups that have 
different effects, at least in some samples. One group of four variables (called GOVDO) 
relates to the honesty and efficiency of government, with the four dimensions relating to 
effectiveness, regulatory efficiency, rule of law and lack of corruption. The second group 
(GOVDEM) relates more to the operation of the democratic process, capturing aspects of 
voice and accountability, and of political stability. Tests reported in Helliwell and Huang 
(2005b) show that GOVDO matters more to the poorer countries, while GOVDEM 
matters more among the richer countries.    
 
4. Policy Implications 
4.1 The Importance of Engagement 
People apparently care a lot about the social context within which they work and play. 
Whatever their personality type, they value trust in their neighbourhoods, their 
workplaces, their public services and their public servants. Trustworthy environments 
both support and are supported by frequency of (successful) contacts. If these results 
should prove as robust as they thus far seem to be, they would seem to have important 
implications for all types of policies and behaviour.  
 
People directly value their engagement with others, including their involvement in the 
process making public decisions and delivering public services. This suggests providing   12 
room for local initiative in the design and delivery of public services. For example, Frey 
and Stutzer (2000) found subjective well-being higher in Swiss cantons with more 
frequent consultations with their electors, and Chandler and Lalonde (1998) found that 
several measures of community-level self-government were associated with dramatically 
lower suicide rates among Aboriginal communities in British Columbia. There is also 
evidence that policies deliberately designed to foster engagement, for example the 
controlled welfare-to-work experiments in New Brunswick and British Columbia, 
produced changes in beliefs such as to support continuing engagement (Gottschalk 2005).  
 
The sizes of the estimated compensating differentials for non-financial features of the 
workplace suggest that both private and public employers need to think again about the 
way they treat their employees and each other. As Richard Layard (2005) argues, the 
trend towards short-term commitments, and the increasing of linking monetary and other 
rewards to individual performance targets, especially short-term ones, may be having 
corrosive effects on trust and loyalties and creating unhappiness in the process. Once the 
importance of trust and engagement are digested, they might be expected to inform 
almost every policy decision about the form and delivery of public services. We might 
expect to see more provision of multi-use public spaces; more linkage among generations 
in the provision of care, education, and leisure; provision of better ways for community 
newcomers to give as well as get public services and social contacts; meshing of 
voluntary and professional workers in more effective ways; and changing the nature of 
the lessons and myths that inspire education. In particular, it is incumbent on economists 
especially, who have been responsible for propagating the myth of economic man, to at 
least consider the costs of policies that rely too much on its assumed truth.  
 
4.2 Data and Research 
Although much can be learned simply by taking on board the wealth of existing studies in 
many disciplines, well-being research will become part of policy-makers’ regular 
assessments only if and as the data and research accumulate in quality and quantity. A 
fairly small set of questions can provide useful assessments of the level and distribution 
of well-being, and of the types of social capital and institutions that support it. As these   13 
data come to be more widely available, and as time series accumulate, it should be 
possible to learn more about what types of institutions and initiatives are likely to be 
successful, and in what circumstances. Although I have argued that remembered utility, 
of the type embodied in answers to life satisfaction questions, has not just an Aristotelian 
cachet but also explanatory power, I would agree with those who see the benefits of a 
much broader and richer set of assessments. The supporting psychological, neurological 
and experiential assessments that are already in progress could and should be used to 
enrich, change, and supplement the more easily and broadly available measures of well-
being. The world is complex, and best understood with many measures, and seen through 
many lenses. Simple and widely collected measures of social capital and well-being have 
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Table 1: Comparing well-being and suicide equations, with different samples, and adding personality factors   
   Comparing current sample with      Testing cross-country personality factors  
   previous sample           in a smaller sample       
Sample  117-obs Sample  136-obs Sample     72-obs Sample          
D.V.  suicide  lsatis  suicide  Lsatis     suicide  suicide  lsatis  lsatis  lsatis 
Average memberships  -6.08  0.51  -5.342  0.346     -3.925  -3.702  0.206  0.049  0.014 
   [2.45]  [2.80]  [3.00]  [2.52]     [2.72]  [2.48]  [1.90]  [0.51]  [0.16] 
Social trust  -16.47  1.83  -16.196  1.895     -9.355  -13.309  2.569  1.646  1.673 
   [2.42]  [4.01]  [2.49]  [3.66]     [0.96]  [1.47]  [3.55]  [2.52]  [2.92] 
Belief in God  -22.82  1.6  -21.419  1.746     -21.901  -7.275  2.152  2.445  1.839 
   [5.35]  [5.01]  [5.92]  [5.61]     [4.89]  [1.67]  [4.25]  [5.12]  [3.03] 
Divorce  4.29  -0.19  4.41  -0.176     5.714  5.789  -0.25  -0.237  -0.238 
   [5.37]  [4.01]  [5.97]  [3.64]     [7.12]  [9.19]  [4.89]  [4.97]  [5.44] 
Unemployment rate  0.11  -0.03  0.056  -0.03     0.082  0.035  -0.031  -0.029  -0.027 
   [0.58]  [3.23]  [0.34]  [2.47]     [0.36]  [0.15]  [2.26]  [2.11]  [2.03] 
Govdo  -1.66  0.82  -1.458  0.78     -4.128  -2.578  0.713  0.742  0.678 
   [1.71]  [10.31]  [1.83]  [10.02]     [4.05]  [2.62]  [7.70]  [8.95]  [6.53] 
Extroversion                -2.673       0.119 
                 [3.98]       [1.90] 
Trust*Psychoticism                      0.292  0.339 
                       [3.60]  [3.36] 
Constant  23.73  5.5  23.19  5.364     19.043  62.702  5.277  5.057  3.072 
   [5.42]  [22.28]  [5.65]  [20.32]     [3.48]  [5.04]  [15.57]  [15.84]  [3.07] 
Observations  117  117  136  136     72  72  72  72  72 





   16 
Table 2: Adding Life expectancy, morbidity years and hearty*          
Sample  136-obs Sample                         
D.V.  Suicide  Suicide  suicide  suicide  suicide  lsatis  lsatis  lsatis  lsatis  lsatis 
Average memberships  -2.069  -5.094  -2.684  -2.63  -4.767  0.047  0.33  0.107  0.107  0.325 
   [1.13]  [3.25]  [1.48]  [1.49]  [3.14]  [0.35]  [2.36]  [0.76]  [0.76]  [2.35] 
Social trust  -7.448  -13.453  -4.437  -3.161  -11.317  0.299  1.72  0.363  0.361  1.689 
   [1.02]  [2.16]  [0.66]  [0.46]  [1.77]  [0.54]  [3.23]  [0.79]  [0.78]  [3.26] 
Belief in God  -17.493  -24.191  -19.957  -21.36  -25.215  1.146  1.923  1.25  1.252  1.938 
   [5.45]  [7.06]  [6.03]  [6.05]  [7.13]  [3.29]  [6.41]  [3.55]  [3.64]  [6.55] 
Divorce  3.728  3.523  3.168  3.16  3.508  -0.11  -0.12  -0.082  -0.082  -0.119 
   [5.31]  [5.38]  [4.98]  [4.77]  [4.97]  [2.08]  [2.16]  [1.58]  [1.58]  [2.15] 
Unemployment rate  0.062  0.05  0.107  0.113  0.063 
-
0.044  -0.03  -0.036  -0.036  -0.03 
   [0.31]  [0.33]  [0.67]  [0.71]  [0.43]  [3.42]  [2.56]  [3.46]  [3.47]  [2.61] 
Govdo  0.82  1.925  3.226  2.297  0.872  0.58  0.565  0.461  0.462  0.581 
   [0.86]  [1.58]  [2.41]  [1.72]  [0.70]  [5.48]  [4.36]  [4.24]  [4.12]  [4.08] 
Self-reported health  -10.028          1.208         
   [2.86]          [5.39]         
Healthy Life Expectancy    -0.832  -1.058         0.053  0.07     
     [3.23]  [4.10]         [2.04]  [3.62]     
Total Life Expectancy        -0.653  -0.378         0.069  0.046 
         [2.04]  [1.15]         [2.90]  [1.36] 
Morbidity Years        1.998  1.864         -0.071  -0.068 
         [3.08]  [3.01]         [2.16]  [2.07] 
Hearty*      -8.587  -7.877         1.07  1.069   
       [2.54]  [2.35]         [4.75]  [4.89]   
Constant  54.123  76.688  84.893  46.743  33.481  1.875  1.959  1.735  1.786  2.594 
   [4.74]  [4.59]  [5.11]  [1.76]  [1.24]  [2.51]  [1.21]  [1.41]  [0.99]  [1.06] 
Observations  103  136  131  131  136  103  136  131  131  136 
R-squared  0.64  0.65  0.68  0.69  0.67  0.81  0.79  0.83  0.83  0.79 
                     
* Hearty is the part of self-reported health status uncorrelated with life expectancy 
and morbidity. For wave 4 of the WVS, when the health question was omitted, 
hearty takes its average value for previous waves.            